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1 Introduction
We study the testable implications of the property that a pair of goods are gross substi-
tutes; strictly speaking, for the joint hypotheses of rationality and gross substitutes. We
propose a non-parametric test for gross substitutes using expenditure data; the test is in
the spirit of the revealed-preference tests first studied by Samuelson (1947) and Afriat
(1967).
Two goods are gross substitutes if when the price of one good increases, demand for
the other good increases. The usual way of testing for gross substitutes between goods
a and b is by estimating the coefficient of the price of good a in a linear regression for
the demand for b. We propose instead a non-parametric test; one that does not require
assuming a functional form for the demand function or for the underlying preferences.
Our test is for a pair of goods: you can use it to test if coffee and tea are substitutes,
for example. You cannot use it to test whether wine, beer, and whisky are substitutes.
The parametric test we mentioned above is also a two-good exercise.
Consumers, of course, buy more than just two goods. But one can isolate a pair
of goods, and test for gross substitutes, under some assumptions about the consumers’
∗Chambers and Echenique acknowledge support from the NSF through grant SES-0751980.
preferences. The assumptions are made routinely in applied studies of demand, see
for example Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).1 Applied researchers use aggregation and
separability to study demand for a subset of broad categories of goods. They will, for
example, aggregate different types of coffee into a composite coffee good. They assume
that agents’ preferences are separable, so that what matters for the purchases of coffee
and tea is the money spent on other goods; not how many steaks, salads, or pizzas were
bought. We stress that assumptions allowing for aggregation and separability are strong
but well understood, and seem to be accepted by the community of researchers on applied
demand.
Our test is simple. Given is a finite collection of observed demand choices at given
prices. We want to reconcile the data with a demand function that satisfies gross substi-
tutes and comes from a rational consumer. That is, we want to know when the data can
be rationalized using a rational demand function with the substitutes property.
Consider the example in Figure 1. We have two observations: x is the bundle pur-
chased at prices p, and x′ is purchased at prices p′. These purchases do not violate gross
substitutes. The observed choices are also consistent with the weak axiom of revealed
preferences, so there is an extension of these purchases to a rational demand function
that is defined for all prices. There is, however, no extension to a demand function which
satisfies gross substitutes: Consider the prices p′′ given by the dotted budget line. Gross
substitutes and the choice of x at p requires a decrease in the consumption of the good
whose price is the same in p and in p′′, so demand at p′′ should lie in the red segment of
the budget line. On the other hand, gross substitutes and x′ requires that demand at p′′
lies in the blue segment of the budget line. Since the red and blue segments are disjoint,
there is no demand function that extends the data and satisfies gross substitutes.
Importantly, the example shows that gross substitutes (and the weak axiom of re-
vealed preference) may be satisfied in the data, but the data may not be rationalizable
1Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) explain how most consumption decisions involve in principle an
unmanageably large number of goods and, simultaneously, an intertemporal and risk dimensions. They
argue that all empirical studies of demand must simplify buy using aggregation and separability
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(a) Two observations: (x, p) and (x′, p′).
x
x′
(b) Implications of Gross Substitutes.
Figure 1: An example with two observations.
by a demand function satisfying gross substitutes. Our test is based on expenditure
shares. We observe that gross substitutes of a demand function is equivalent to the
monotonicity of expenditure shares: Demand satisfies gross substitutes if and only if the
share of expenditure corresponding to good a increases as the price of good b increases.
Our test is simply to verify that the data satisfies the monotonicity of expenditure shares.
That is, if the shares in the data are monotonic then they can be extended to a full de-
mand function defined for all prices, and the demand so defined will be smooth, rational,
and induce monotonic expenditure shares.
The problem of gross substitutes is thus much simpler than the problem of testing
for complements, which we have studied elsewhere (Chambers, Echenique, and Shmaya,
2008). We note that the current paper only deals with the testable implications of substi-
tutes, not the preferences that generate substitutes. The class of preferences generating
substitutes is known from the work of Fisher (1972).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the notation and
gives our main definitions; Section 3 presents our result; the proof is in Section 4. Finally,
in Section 5 we present a discussion of our results.
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2 Preliminaries
Let R2+ be the domain of consumption bundles, and R2++ the domain of possible prices.
We use standard notational conventions: x ≤ y if xi ≤ yi in R, for i = 1, 2; x < y if
x ≤ y and x 6= y; and x  y if xi < yi in R, for i = 1, 2. We write x · y for the inner
product x1y1 + x2y2.
A function u : R2+ → R is monotone increasing if x ≤ y implies u(x) ≤ u(y). It is
monotone decreasing if (−u) is monotone increasing. Let A ⊆ R2 be open. A function
u : A→ R is smooth if its partial derivatives of all orders exist.
A function D : R2++ × R+ → R2+ is a demand function if it is homogeneous of degree
0 and satisfies p ·D(p, I) = I, for all p ∈ R2++ and I ∈ R+.
Say that a demand function satisfies gross substitutes if, for fixed p1 and I, p2 7→
D1((p1, p2), I) is monotone increasing, and for fixed p2 and I, p1 7→ D1((p1, p2), I) is
monotone increasing.
For all (p, I) ∈ R2++×R+, define the budget B (p, I) byB (p, I) =
{
x ∈ R2+ : p · x ≤ I
}
.
Note that B (p, I) is compact, by the assumption that prices are strictly positive.
A demand functionD is rational if there is a monotone increasing function u : R2+ → R
such that
D (p, I) = argmaxx∈B(p,I)u(x). (1)
In that case, we say that u is a rationalization of (or that it rationalizes) D. Note that
part of the definition of rationalizability is that D(p, I) is the unique maximizer of u in
B(p, I).
3 Result
We shall use homogeneity to regard demand as only a function of prices: D(p, I) =
D((1/I)p, 1), so we can normalize income to 1. In this case, we regard demand as a
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function D : R2++ → R2+ with p ·D(p) = 1 for all p ∈ R2++.
A partial demand function is a function D : P → R2+ where P ⊆ R2++ and p ·D(p) = 1
for every p ∈ P ; P is called the domain of D. So a demand function is a partial demand
function whose domain is R2++. The concept of the partial demand function allows us
to study finite demand observations. We imagine that we have observed demand at all
prices in P (see e.g. Afriat (1967), Diewert and Parkan (1983) or Varian (1982)).
Theorem 1. Let Q be a finite subset of R2++ and let D : Q → R2+ be a partial demand
function. Then D is the restriction to Q of a smooth and rational demand satisfying
gross substitutes if and only if q′1D1(q
′) ≤ q1D1(q) for every q, q′ ∈ Q such that q1 ≤ q′1
and q′2 ≤ q2.
4 Proof of Theorem 1
4.1 Lemmas about demand functions on R2++
Say that a partial demand function satisfies the the weak axiom of revealed preference if
p ·D(p′) > 1 whenever p′ ·D(p) < 1. With two goods, the weak axiom is equivalent to
the strong axiom of revealed preference, and hence characterizes rational demand.
Throughout this section we fix a demand function D : R2++ → R2+. We introduce the
expenditure share function associated to D: for i ∈ {1, 2}, let pii = pi(D)i : R2++ → [0, 1]
be given by pii(p) = piDi(p). Let  be the partial order over R2++ that is given by
p′  p ⇐⇒ p′1 ≥ p1 and p′2 ≤ p2.
Say that a function f : R2++ → R is -monotone increasing if x  y implies
f(x) ≤ f(y).
Lemma 1. The following conditions are equivalent
1. pi 7→ D−i(p) is monotone increasing in pi for every p−i.
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2. pi 7→ pi−i(p) is monotone increasing in pi for every p−i.
3. pi 7→ pii(p) is monotone decreasing in pi for every p−i.
Proof. 1 ⇐⇒ 2 follows from p−iD−i(p) = pi−i(p) and 2 ⇐⇒ 3 follows from pii(p) =
1− pi−i(p).
Corollary 1. D satisfies substitutes if and only if pi1 is -monotone increasing, i.e.
pi1(p
′) ≥ pi1(p) whenever p′  p.
Proof. pi1 is -monotone increasing iff p2 7→ pi1(p1, p2) is monotone increasing for every p1
and p1 7→ pi1(p1, p2) is monotone decreasing for every p2. By Lemma 1 the first condition
is equivalent to p2 7→ D1(p) being monotone increasing and the second condition is
equivalent to p1 7→ D2(p) being monotone increasing.
Lemma 2. If D satisfies substitutes then p1 7→ D1(p1, p2) is monotone decreasing for
fixed p2
Proof. Note that D1(p1, p2) = pi1(p1, p2)/p1. By Lemma 1 the nominator is decreasing in
p1. Also, the denominator is increasing. Therefore the quotient is decreasing.
Lemma 3. If D satisfies gross substitutes and p′  p then D(p′)1 ≤ D(p)1 and D(p′)2 ≥
D(p)2.
Proof. Let p′′ be given by p′′1 = p
′
1 and p
′′
2 = p2. Then
D(p′)1 ≤ D(p′′)1 ≤ D(p)1,
where the first inequality follows from the definition of substitutes and the second from
Lemma 2. The second assertion follows from symmetry between the products.
The following lemma was shown by Kehoe and Mas-Colell (1984) for excess demand
functions, and the case of three goods.
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Lemma 4. If D satisfies gross substitutes then D satisfies the weak axiom of revealed
preference.
Proof. Assume that p, p′ ∈ R2++ and let x = D(p) and x′ = D(p′). Assume that p′ ·x < 1.
We claim that p ·x′ > 1. Indeed, if p′ ≥ p then p′ ·x ≥ p ·x = 1, a contradiction. Assume
therefore without loss of generality that p′2 < p2. If p
′
1 < p1 then p
′  p and therefore
p · x′ > p′ · x′ = 1,
as desired. Assume therefore that p′1 ≥ p1, so that p′  p. Then, it follows from Lemma 3
that x′1 ≤ x1 and x′2 ≥ x2. Therefore
p · x′ = p1 · x′1 + p2 · x′2 =
p · x+ p′ · x′ − p′ · x+ (p1 − p′1) · (x′1 − x1) + (p′2 − p2) · (x2 − x′2) > 1,
since p · x = p′ · x′ = 1.
4.2 Partial Demand
The condition in the theorem is equivalent to q′1D1(q
′) ≤ q1D1(q) for every q, q′ ∈ Q such
that q′  q. Necessity follows immediately from Corollary 1. For sufficiency, fix  > 0
such that
if q′i > qi − 2 then q′i ≥ qi, (2)
for every q, q′ ∈ Q and every i ∈ {1, 2}. Let pi : R2 → [0, 1] be given by
pi(p) = max{q1 ·D1(q)|q ∈ S(p)} (3)
where S(p) = {q ∈ Q|q1 > p1 −  and q2 < p2 + } and the maximum of the empty set is
by definition 0. If p′  p then S(p′) ⊆ S(p). Therefore pi is -monotone.
Claim 5. If ‖p− q‖∞ <  for some p ∈ R2++ and q ∈ Q then pi(p) = q1D1(q).
Proof. Since q ∈ S(p) it follows from (3) that pi(p) ≥ q1D1(q). On the other hand, let
q′ ∈ S(p). Then q′1 > p1− > q1−2 and therefore q′1 ≥ q1 by (2) and q′2 < p2+ < q2+2
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and therefore q′2 ≤ q2 by (2). Thus q′  q and therefore q′1D1(q′) ≤ q1D1(q). Since this is
true for every q′ ∈ S(p) it follows from (3) that pi(p) ≤ q1D1(q).
Let ψ : R2 → R2 be a smooth function such that ψ(τ) ≥ 0 for every τ ∈ R2, ψ(τ) = 0
whenever ‖τ‖∞ ≥  and ∫
R2
ψ = 1. (4)
For example, we can choose
ψ(x, y) =

1
C
e−1/(1−(x/)
2)−1/(1−(y/)2), if |x| <  and |y| < 
0, otherwise,
for a suitable normalizing factor C.
Let p˜i : R2++ → [0, 1] be given by p˜i = ψ ∗ pi, i.e.
p˜i(p) =
∫
R2
ψ(τ)pi(p− τ)dτ .
Then p˜i is smooth (as a convolution of a smooth function with a bounded function),
-monotone (as a convolution of a nonnegative function with a -monotone function)
and p˜i(q) = q1D1(q) for every q ∈ Q by Claim 5 and the properties of ψ. Finally, Let D˜ :
R2++ → R2+ be the demand function given by D˜1(p) = p˜i(p)/p1 and D˜2(p) = (1− p˜i(p))/p2.
Then D˜ is a smooth demand function that satisfies gross substitutes by Corollary 1. By
Lemma 4 D˜ satisfies the weak axiom, and hence it is rational.
5 Conclusion and remarks
The property of gross substitutes is of obvious interest to economists. One indication of
this fact is that all the “principles of economics” courses that we are aware of discuss
gross substitutes. We believe that the simple test we have developed is of interest as well.
We have determined the testable implications of gross substitutes of a pair of goods.
The implications are very simple: the data itself must satisfy the definition in the form
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of the monotonicity of expenditure shares (Corollary 1). One might want to study more
than two goods, for example whether beer, wine and whisky are substitutes. We note that
such a study would still require the type of assumptions we implicitly made: one needs
to aggregate different types of beer, for example, into a composite beer good. One would
also need to separate the three goods from the steaks, fishes and salads the consumer is
also deciding on.
In any case, with more than two goods there are additional implications than just
the data satisfying the monotonicity of expenditure shares. We finalize with a four-good
example making this point.
Example 1. We suppose that we have data {(xk, pk), (xl, pl)} given, meaning that we have
a partial demand function defined on two observations, k and l, where xk = D(pk) and
xl = D(pl). Thus, P = {pk, pl}. All vectors lie in R4; the observations are in the table
below.
It is easy to verify that the two observations satisfy the weak axiom of revealed
preference, and hence the strong axiom (as there are only two observations). Note
that pk · xl = 3/4 + 9/32 = 33/32 > 1, so xk is not revealed preferred to xl. Hence
{(xk, pk), (xl, pl)} satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preference. The observations also
satisfy monotonicity of expenditure shares with four goods because one price increases
and one decreases.
Now, we claim that there is no x one can choose at prices p = (1/2, 3, 3, 2) such that
both the weak axiom and gross substitutes are satisfied. Concretely, the only x chosen at
p compatible with substitutes violates the weak axiom with respect to {(xl, pl), (x, p)}.
Comparing p and pk, gross substitutes demands that x1 ≥ xk1: The table shows the case
where x is such that x1 = x
k
1 = 1 and the rest is spent on x4. We show that this is the
most favorable case.
We write R and S for the weak and strict revealed preference relations, respectively.
So y S z if y is demanded at prices py and py · z < 1, and y R z if y is demanded at prices
py and py · z ≤ 1.
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p1 p2 p3 p4 x1 x2 x3 x4
(pk, xk) 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
(pl, xl) 1/3 1/3 8/3 8/3 3/4 0 0 9/32
(p, x) 1/2 3 3 2 1 0 0 1/4
First, note that x S xl, as p · xl = (1/2)(3/4) + 2(9/32) = 30/32 < 1, and xl R x:
pl · x = 1/3 + (8/3)(1/4) = 1. So {(xl, pl), (x, p)} with x chosen as in the table violate
the weak axiom.
Second, we argue that this is the case for any x that satisfies gross substitutes with
respect to (pk, xk). We have xSxl independently of the choice of x, so we need to see that
pl · x ≤ 1 for all x with x1 ≥ 1. Given a choice for x1, consider the x that maximize pl · x
subject to p·x = 1. That is: maximize x2/3+8x3/3+8x4/3 s.t. 3(x2+x3)+2x4 = 1−x1/2.
The solution is to set (x2, x3, x4) = (0, 0, (1/2)(1− x1/2)). Now,
pl · x ≤ (1/3)x1 + (1/2− x1/4)(8/3) = 8/6 + (1/3− 2/3)x1
= 8/6− (1/3)x1 ≤ 4/3− 1/3 = 1,
as x1 ≥ 1. Thus xl R x, which together with x S xl is a violation of the weak axiom of
revealed preference.
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